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EUTHANASIA:
A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PEACEFUL DEATH
I. INTRODUCTION

Today, people live much longer than they did in the past.' Advances
in medical technology have enabled doctors to practice preventive
medicine and cure more illnesses, 2 but a number of incurable diseases and
debilitating afflictions still remain.' The "help" that the medical
profession can extend to individuals with such diseases is limited to
keeping the person alive and functioning in a sense.' These individuals,
however, usually must endure pain, severe incapacity, and indignity.' As
a result, more people have been choosing to "die with dignity" 6 with the
active assistance of a physician. 7 This practice commonly is referred to
as "euthanasia" or "mercy killing."' As the number of these assisted
1. The average life expectancy of males at birth has increased from 46.3 years in
1900 to 71.8 years in 1989, while that of females has increased from 48.3 years in 1900
to 78.5 years in 1989. A16ERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., 1990 LIFE INSURANCE FACT
BOOK 107 (1991).
2. See Lawrence K. Altman, More Physicians Broach Forbidden Subject of
Euthanasia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1991, at C3; Robert L. Geltzer et al., National
Conference on Birth, Death, andLaw, 29 JURR4ETRICS J. 403 (1989).
3. For example, cancer, which causes a great number of deaths, is characterized by
the uncontrolled multiplication of abnormal cells in the body. An involvement of a vital
organ in the cancerous cells can lead to the patient's death. Poor cure success rates for
a number of cancers are due to late detection. Any possible treatment for any form of
cancer, however, has its disadvantages and does not always cure the disease. 2 NEW
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 795-96 (15th ed. 1985). Alzheimer's disease, a
degenerative disease affecting the nerve cells, is thought to be the largest single cause of
senile dementia. Some of its effects are speech disturbance and severe memory
impairment leading to the progressive loss of mental faculties. 1 id. at 306. Another
debilitating disease is Parkinson's disease, which produces severe physical handicaps
while leaving the senses and the intellect intact. This disease, which may progress over
a period of 10 to 20 years, leaves the individual helpless to care for himself/herself but
with the mental capacity to understand his/her helplessness. 9 id. at 160.
4. See Altman, supra note 2, at C3.
5. Id.
6. See B.D. Colen, CaliforniaIs Voting on the Right to Die, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct.
29, 1992, at 23.
7. See infra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
8. Thomas H. Sharp, Jr. & Thomas H. Crofts, Jr., Death With Dignity-The
Physician's Civil Liability, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 86 (1975). Throughout this note, the
terms "assisted suicide" and "euthanasia" are used interchangeably. Because "mercy
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suicides increases, state legislatures and courts will be pressured to take
action. 9
The United States Supreme Court recently has taken a step toward
addressing this issue with its decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health."0 The Court held that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a competent adult has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.11 Allowing people to
refuse treatment is, in effect, allowing people to choose death. This death,
however, could be slow and painful. The question therefore is whether
this constitutionally protected liberty interest should be extended to allow
people to receive active assistance in dying.
Part II of this note begins with a brief history of euthanasia throughout
the world. Part III analyzes the development of patients' rights in the
United States under the common law and the U.S. Constitution. Part IV
applies these rights to assisted suicide12 and argues that the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest protected in Cruzan should be broadly
construed to apply to euthanasia."3 Part IV also weighs this individual
liberty interest against the four state interests identified by the Court in
Cruzan and contends that, in some cases, the individual's liberty interest
should outweigh the interests of the State so that the individual can die in
the least painful way.'" Part V suggests that to protect the States'
interests, only physicians should be allowed to assist in patient suicides.
In so doing, the patient's liberty interest should protect physicians against
criminal charges.'" Part VI of this note offers suggestions for the
establishment of euthanasia procedures to protect the interests of both the
State and the individual.
killing" normally denotes a choice by someone other than the patient, however, this note
does not use "mercy killing" interchangeably with "suicide" or "euthanasia."
9. See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz, Kevorkian Aids in 2 More Suicides: Michigan
Governor Signs Bill Making Practice a Felony, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1992, at A2
(discussing the Michigan legislation signed by Gov. John Engler making assisted suicide
a felony punishable by up to four years in prison and a $2,000 fine); see also Colen,
supra note 6, at 23 (examining the debate surrounding proposed legislation in California
and Washington that would have legalized physician-assisted suicide if it had passed).
10. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
11. See id. at 279 n.7.
12. See infra part IV.A-B.
13. See infra part IV.B.
14. See infra part V.C.
15. See infra part V.
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II. HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA

The concept of euthanasia,16 in its many forms, is not confined to the
present day. 7 From the ancient Greek and Roman eras to today, the
attitudes of philosophers and legislators toward euthanasia have run the
gamut from outright acceptance to condemnation. 8 This history
establishes the backdrop for the current debate in the United States on the
status of active euthanasia.' 9
Although ancient Greek and Roman philosophers generally rejected
the idea of suicide,' euthanasia (meaning "a good death") met with
wider acceptance. 2 Thus, suicide, as a means of achieving a good death,
was more acceptable.' For example, in his Republic, the Greek
philosopher Plato favored suicide as a remedy for unbearable pain.'
Aristotle, another Greek philosopher, also endorsed this practice in his
Politics.,
The Stoics of Rome, however, were the greatest ancient proponents
of euthanasia.' Stoicism embraced the belief that freedom was based on
never surrendering the deliberate will to passion or compulsion.' By
committing suicide, individuals were exercising their deliberate will to
control their deaths. The Stoics's philosophy justified suicide, even
glorified it, because of this desire for control. 7 After the Roman
16. Euthanasia is derived from the Greek "eu" meaning "good," and "thanatos"
meaning "death." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (1990)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
17. See infra notes 20-54 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 20-94 and accompanying text.
19. For a more in-depth discussion of the historical background, see Raanan Gillon,
Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia:Historical Perspective, in EUTHANASIA AND THE
RIGHT TO DEATH 173 (A.B. Downing ed., 1969); Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A
ConstitutionalRight?, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 1 (1985).
20. Gillon, supra note 19, at 174.
21. Id.
22. DEREK HuMPHRY & ANN WICKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE 4-5 (1986).
23. 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 711 (Int'l ed. 1985) [hereinafter AMERICANA].
24. Id. (illustrating euthanasia's long history in theory and practice).
25. Gillon, supranote 19, at 174-76.
26. Id. at 174-75.
27. See Marzen et al., supranote 19, at 25; see also James Gutman, Death: Western
Philosophical Thought, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETicS 235, 238-39 (1978)
[hereinafter BIOETHICS] (outlining tenets of Stoicism including the Stoics' approval of
suicide).
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conquest of Greece, suicide acquired this exalted status throughout Greece
as well.'
The views of the medical profession were consistent with the
philosophical views of the time. For example, Roman medical history has
recorded many instances in which doctors gave poison to patients who
were dying in pain." But the Greco-Roman philosophers' recognition of
this "freedom to leave"' and the practices of the medical profession
were inconsistent with the legal status of suicide. 3 Roman law
specifically forbade suicide and imposed a penalty.32 Notwithstanding this
prohibition, Stoic attitudes toward suicide prevailed throughout
33 Greece and
Rome for the first two centuries after the death of Christ.
The practice of euthanasia was not limited to the Greek and Roman
cultures.' For example, in both India and Sardinia, a form of euthanasia
was practiced.35 Euthanasia in these societies was forced on the elderly
against their will,' and was therefore diametrically opposed to the
Greco-Roman idea of a good death. The ancient Celts, on the other hand,
practiced voluntary euthanasia.3 7 The prevalence of euthanasia in Celtic
society was based on the belief that if a person died of old age or disease,
the person would go to hell.38 If one committed suicide before they
"spoilt," however, the person would go to heaven.39 Consequently,
suicide was often committed to achieve a good death.'
28. See Gillon, supra note 19, at 175.
29. Id. at 176.
30. Gerald J. Gruman, Death andDying:EuthanasiaandSustainingLife-Historical
Perspectives, in 1 BIOET-Ics, supra note 27, at 261.
31. Id.
32. Marzen et al., supra note 19, at 26. Although it did not prove to be a strong
deterrent, the penalty resulted in the forfeiture of the suicides' goods and in the
confiscation of the suicides' estates, so that they could not pass their possessions on to
their heirs. Id.
33. Id.
34. 10 AMERICANA, supra note 23, at 711.

35. Id.
36. Id. Euthanasia can also mean ending the lives of those no longer considered
useful. This was the type of euthanasia practiced by these societies. Although in India it
was customary to throw old people into a river, in ancient Sardinia old men were clubbed
to death by their own sons. ld.
37. See Gillon, supra note 19, at 182.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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The acceptance of euthanasia and suicide rapidly diminished with the

spread of Christianity. 4 The major reason for this decreased acceptance
was the Sixth Commandment, which orders, "Thou shalt not kill."42A
interpreted by St. Augustine, this commandment also embodied a
prohibition against suicide or self-murder.43 As a result of this
interpretation, numerous councils of the Roman Catholic Church imposed
sanctions on suicide." Civil penalties against suicide also existed.45 The
Church's strong stance against suicide, and the accompanying religious

and civil sanctions, reduced the incidence of suicide to negligible
numbers."
This opposition to suicide remained strong until the seventeenth
century when scattered works questioning the ban on suicide were
published.4 7 In the eighteenth century, the controversy over suicide
escalated. 4' The Church continued to strongly oppose suicide 49 while the
philosophers debated the issue.' Because of the penalties related to
suicide, some philosophers who opposed suicide believed that coroner

juries should be merciful when determining the cause of death in apparent

suicide cases. 5' During the same period, physicians were focusing on
alleviating pain to make death as humane and natural as possible.52
Although religious and legal prohibitions prevented physicians from going
41. See Deborah A. Wainey, Note, Active Voluntary Euthanasia:The Ultimate Act
of Carefor the Dying, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV.645, 648 (1989) (stating that "[t]he effect
[of Christianity] on the suicide rate was immense").
42. Exodus 20:13.
43. See Marzen et al., supra note 19, at 27.
44. See id. at 28-29. "The Council of Arles (452 A.D.), for example, incorporated
the Roman law's forfeiture of a suicide's estate. The Council of Braga (563 A.D.)
banned religious rites for suicides. The Antisidor Council (590 A.D.) provided penalties
for suicide, and the Synod of Nimes (1284 A.D.) denied suicides Christian burial." Id.
45. See Wainey, supra note 41, at 648.
46. See Marzen et al., supra note 19, at 29.
47. See, e.g., JOHN DONNE, BIATHANATOS 36 (The Facsimile Text Society 1930)
(arguing that sometimes suicide is justified and approved by God).
48. See Wainey, supra note 41, at 649.
49. See Marzen et al., supra note 19, at 39.
50. Id. at 38.
51. Id. at 39. The coroner juries were responsible for determining the cause of
death. John Jortion, an opponent of suicide, believed that these juries were correct in
avoiding suicide as the cause of death. Id.
52. See Wainey, supra note 41, at 649.
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further than this in rendering assistance to dying patients,5 3 the idea of
an improved death prevailed throughout the nineteenth century.-'
Today, in the United States, euthanasia is receiving varying degrees
of support from both private and public groups.55 In particular, the
medical profession shows the diversity of the views on euthanasia. 56
While several physicians recently have participated in assisted suicide,5 7
numerous articles and letters discussing the pros and cons of euthanasia
have been published in medical journals. 5'
A number of associations strongly advocate euthanasia and assisted
suicide." These groups, including the National Hemlock Society, believe
that terminally ill patients should have the right to decide when to die.'
Derek Humphry, the founder of the National Hemlock Society, has
published two books on the subject.61 Final Exit, the second of his two
books, is a suicide manual.62 Another group, Washington Citizens for
Death With Dignity, backed a recent initiative that would have legalized
assisted suicide and euthanasia in the State of Washington.' Although the
53. Id.
54. See Gillon, supra note 19, at 183.
55. See infra notes 56-94 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., BRUCE HILTON, FiRsT Do No HARM 98-99 (1991) (discussing central
issues surrounding bioethical dilemmas such as genetic engineering, euthanasia, the use
of humans as guinea pigs, and other issues).
57. See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Marcia Angell, Prisonersof Technology: The Caseof Nancy Cruzan,
322 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1226 (1990); Robert W. Carton, The Road to Euthanasia,263
JAMA 2221 (1990); Herbert S. Gross, Correspondence, Euthanasia Debate, 323 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1770 (1990); Peter A. Singer & Mark Siegler, Euthanasia-A Critique,
322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1881 (1990); see It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988);
Letters on Physician Participationin Assisted Suicide, 263 JAMA 1197 (1990); Letters
on Euthanasia, LANCET, Feb. 17, 1990, at 414; Letters on Euthanasia,LANCET, Jan.
27, 1990, at 232; William Reichel & Arthur J. Dyck, Euthanasia:A Contemporary
Moral Quandary, LANcEr, Dec. 2, 1989, at 1321.
59. For example, the National Hemlock Society is a strong euthanasia supporter.
Other groups include Americans Against Human Suffering and Washington Citizens for
Death with Dignity. See ARTHUR S. BERGER & JOYCE BERGER, To DIE OR NOT TO DIE?
(1990).
60. See Timothy Egan, "HerMind Was Everything, "DeadWonan 'sHusbandSays,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at B6.
61. See DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL Exrr (1991); DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETT,
JEAN'S WAY (1992).
62. See Katrine Ames et al., Last Rights, NEWSWEEK, Aug 26, 1991, at 40.
63. See Isabel Wilkerson, Opponents Weigh Action Against Doctor Who Aided
Suicides, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1991, at A10.
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initiative did not pass, it had very strong support from Washington

citizens.'
Euthanasia is even beginning to receive some support from the general
public. In a 1991 poll of 800 Americans, sixty-four percent said doctors
should not be prosecuted for helping the terminally ill commit suicide.'
News articles and editorials on euthanasia are also starting to appear in

mainstream newspapers.'
At present, the status of euthanasia in the United States criminaljustice system is uncertain. Although suicide is not against the law,67
assisting in a suicide is a crime in many states." 8 Assisted suicide or
active euthanasia prosecutions, however, - do not usually result in
convictions.' For example, in June 1990, Bertram Harper of Loomis,
Cal., traveled with his wife Virginia to Michigan so that he could assist
64. NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 6, 1991). The initiative was
defeated by a slim majority. Forty-six percent of the voters approved the initiative. Earl
Ubell, Should Death Be a Patient's Choice?, PARADE MAO., Feb. 9, 1992, at 24.
65. See Rorie Sherman, Bioethics Debate: Poll Reveals Attitudes on a Wide Range
of Issues,from CriminalLiabilityfor PregnantSubstance Abusers to Informing Patients
of Physician'sHIV Status, NAT'L L.J., May 13, 1991, at 1.
66. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 2; Ames et al., supra note 62; B.D. Colen,
Easing Towards Euthanasia, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 5, 1991, at 61; Editorial, Dealing
Death or Mercy?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1991, at E17; Yale Kasimar, An Unraveling
of Morality, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1991, at A25; Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TITMES,
May 11, 1991, at A9; James Vorenberg, Going Gently, with Dignity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1991, at A25.
67. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1988) (reading that "[sluicide is not
now a crime in Kansas"); Catherine D. Shaffer, CrininalLiabilityfor Assisting Suicide,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 348, 350 (1986) ("A survey of the criminal codes of the fifty states
and three United States territories reveals that no jurisdiction defines suicide, by statute,
as a criminal act.").
68. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131103 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 10-104 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West
1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645
(1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 213406 (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (West 1964); MInN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.215 (West 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-6 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
120.30 (McKinney 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813 (West 1983); OR. REv.
STAT. § 163.125 (1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (1983); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 33, § 4009 (1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1989); V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 14, § 2141 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982).
69. See Timothy P. Brooks, Comment, State v. Forest: Mercy Killing and Malice
in North Carolina, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1160, 1168-69 (1988).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

her in committing suicide.' The Harpers chose Michigan because its law

does not specifically forbid assisted suicide. 1I Virginia had been

diagnosed with terminal breast and liver cancer' and, according to her
daughter, had begun planning her suicide when her condition was first

diagnosed.' 3 After Virginia took tranquilizers, other medication, and
alcohol, Bertram pulled a plastic bag over her head and secured it. 4
Bertram was charged with second-degree murder because the prosecution
contended that Bertram crossed the line between assisting in suicide and
murder when he pulled the bag over Virginia's head.' s A jury acquitted
him of all charges.76 This leniency seems to be the current trend. 77
Historically, judges and juries have been sympathetic to physicians

involved in cases of assisted suicide. 78 Numerous cases involving doctors
who have been indicted on a variety of homicide charges have resulted in
acquittals due to a lack of proof of causation. 9 In June 1990, Dr. Jack
Kevorkian connected his homemade suicide device' to a woman with
Alzheimer's disease."' The woman, Janet Adkins, pushed a button on the
70. See Man Clearedof Murder in Aiding Wife's Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
1991, at A9 [hereinafter Man Cleared].
71. Id.
72. "Terminal illness has been defined as an illness expected to cause imminent
death." Rebecca Morgan & Barbara Harty-Golder, Constitutional Development of
JudicialCriteriain Right-to-Die Cases: From Brain Dead to Persistent Vegetative State,
23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 721, 752 (1988).
73. See Man Cleared, supra note 70, at A9.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Brooks, supra note 69, at 1168-69. Fifty-six cases of mercy-killing were
reported between 1920 and 1985: 10 defendants were found guilty and imprisoned; 20
received suspended sentences; 15 were acquitted; six were dismissed; and five were
never brought to trial. Id. at 1168.
78. See Vicki L. Gilbreath, The Right of the Terminally Ill to Die, with Assistance
if Necessary, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 403, 414 n.74 (1986).
79. Id. at 415 n.74. For example, in 1950, due to lack of causation, Dr. Herman
Sander was acquitted of first-degree murder for injecting air into the veins of a cancer
patient. Id. In 1973, Dr. Vincent Montemarano raised the defense of lack of causation
in his murder trial for injecting potassium chloride into the veins of a comatose throatcancer patient. Id.
80. See Lisa Belkin, Doctor Tells of First Death Using His Suicide Device, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 6, 1990, at Al.
81. See generally WEBSTER'S, supra note 16, at 76 (defining Alzheimer's disease
as a degenerative disease of the central nervous system characterized especially by
premature senile mental deterioration).
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machine' causing it to send a lethal combination of chemicals into her
bloodstream. Although Dr. Kevorkian was charged with murder in
December 1990,I the charges were dismissed later that month due to
lack of causation.' Dr. Kevorkian has since assisted in several more
suicides.86
In a recent case, Dr. Timothy Quill, a New York physician,
prescribed barbiturates for a leukemia patients and told her how many
pills were necessary to commit suicide. 8 The woman eventually used the
pills to end her life.8 9 Although assisting in a suicide is a felony in New
York," Dr. Quill was not charged with any crime. 9' In addition, a state
medical panel ruled that his actions were ethically appropriate and that no
misconduct charges should be filed.' From these cases, it appears that
physician-assisted suicide is becoming more prevalent?' and that more
doctors are beginning to make their willingness to participate known to the
public.'
82. See Belkin, supra note 80.
83. See Physician Charged With Aiding Suicide, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1990, at 2.
84. Id.
85. See Charles Edward-Anderson, Suicide Doctor Wins Dismissal, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1991, at 22.
86. See, e.g., Kevorkian Asks Judge to Dismiss A Charge ofAssisting in a Suicide,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, at A7 (stating that in the past three years Dr. Kevorkian
has helped 17 terminally ill
individuals commit suicide).
87. See Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision
Making, 324 New ENR. J. MED. 691, 692 (1991).
88. See id. at 693.
89. See id.
90. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (MeKinney 1987).
91. See Doctor Not Charged in Patient's Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1991, at
28.
92. Doctor Assists in Two More Suicides, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1991, at Al
[hereinafter Doctor Assists].
93. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 2, at C3 (quoting a University of Minnesota
ethicist as stating that "more than a dozen doctors have confided'in him about their role
in responding to requests from conscious, mentally clear patients to help them die");
B.D. Colen, Return of "Dr. Death," N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 1991, at 5 (discussing
euthanasia with a Harvard University psychiatrist who has interviewed 17 physicians who
have participated in euthanasia).
94. See, e.g., It's Over, Debbie, supra note 58, at 272 (describing a lethal injection
being given to a cancer patient by a resident); Quill, supra note 87, at 693 (explaining
that a leukemia patient was told the necessary number of barbiturates needed to commit
suicide).
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF PATIENTS' RIGHTS

A. Common-Law Basis
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a common-law right
to refuse medical treatment in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford.95
In holding that a plaintiff could not be ordered to submit to a physical
examination, the Court found that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded by common law than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law." The right to refuse medical treatment is drawn from the commonlaw doctrine of informed consent,' which requires a physician to inform
a patient about the risks, alternatives, and possible outcomes of a
suggested treatment.9" This doctrine was recognized in Schloendorff v.
Society of the New York Hospital,' in which Judge Cardozo stated that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for
which he is liable in damages.""0 0 In the United States, courts deciding
cases involving patients' rights relied on this doctrine until the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in In re Quinlan.10'
B. Constitutional Authority
1. Application of the Right to Privacy
Before In re Quinlan is examined, an analysis of constitutional
authority is necessary. The United States Constitution does not expressly
95. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
96. Id. at 251.
97. See Patrick N. Leduc, Comment, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health and the Right to Die: Where Should the Line Be Drawn?, 14 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 643, 648 (1991).
98. See id.
99. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
100. Id. at 93.
101. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see infra notes 113-27
and accompanying text.
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mention patient rights. Lower courts faced with this issue'02 have had to
infer patient rights from Supreme Court decisions on related issues.
The Court's decisions that are most applicable to this issue deal with

the right to privacy. For example, in 1965 the Court, in Griswold v.

Connecticut,"° held that the marital relationship was protected within a
zone of privacy derived from the penumbra of specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights. " The law at issue, which forbid the use of

contraceptives, was struck down for being unnecessarily broad and for
invading the individual's constitutionally protected right to privacy. 5
Seven years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird,"'° the Court expanded this
right to privacy to single people. In Eisenstadt, a lecturer appealed his

conviction for giving an unmarried woman a contraceptive foam. 0 7 The
Court held that the Massachusetts law forbidding the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons was unconstitutional because the
constitutional right of privacy inheres to the individual, not the marital
couple. 0 8 Justice Brennan stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
102. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986)
(request for removal of nasogastric feeding tube); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984) (request to disconnect respirator), affld sub nom. Bartling v.
Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1986); Severns v. Wilmington
Medical Ctr., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (request to terminate life-sustaining treatment);
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (request for termination
of artificial life-sustaining device), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); State v. McAfee,
385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989) (request for removal of ventilator); Norwood Hosp. v.
Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991) (refusal of blood transfusion); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (refusal of treatment
for leukemia); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987) (request for removal of lifesustaining respirator); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (request for removal of
nasogastric feeding tube); State ex reL White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (Va. 1982)
(request to terminate force-feeding); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983) (request
to terminate life-sustaining treatment).
103. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Connecticut law forbade the use of any drug, medicinal
article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Two directors of Planned
Parenthood League were charged with assisting married persons in committing this
offense. The Court held that the Connecticut law unconstitutionally intruded upon the
right of marital privacy. See id. at 485-86.
104. See-id. at 484-86.
105. See id.
106. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
107. See id. at 440.
108. See id. at 453-54.
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from unwarranted governmental intrusion in matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."" °

Then, in its 1973 decision, Roe v. Wade,"' the Supreme Court

relied on its previous decisions regarding contraceptives to decide a case

involving a medical procedure."' The Court held that the right to
privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy."11

Further development in privacy rights took place in the state courts.

In the landmark case of In re Quinlan, 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court
applied the right to privacy to the termination of treatment being provided
to Karen Quinlan, a young woman in a persistent vegetative state. "' The
case was initiated by the woman's father so that he could be appointed her

guardian, which would allow him to order the discontinuance of the
extraordinary measures keeping his daughter alive.

5

Relying on past

Supreme Court decisions," 6 mainly Griswold and Roe, the court

recognized an implicit constitutional right to privacy, existing in the

"penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights."" 17 The court
also reasoned that because this right extended to a woman's decision to
terminate a pregnancy, it must also extend to her decision to decline
medical treatment in proper cases."'

Although the court briefly mentioned the "claimed interests of the
State"-the preservation of life and defense of the right of a physician to
administer as he or she sees fit-which were competing against the rights

of Ms. Quinlan, it did not give them much weight." 9 This was
evidenced in its statement that "the State's interest ...

weakens and the

109. Id. at 453.
110. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
111. See id. at 152-53.
112. ld. at 153.
113. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Joseph Quinlan,
father of Karen Ann Quinlan, sought to be appointed his daughter's guardian. Because
his daughter was in a chronic persistent vegetative state, he wished to be appointed her
guardian so that he could order the discontinuation of all extraordinary medical
procedures sustaining her life. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Karen Quinlan
had a constitutional right to privacy and that the best way to protect her right was to
appoint her father as her guardian. Id. at 664.
114. See id. at 660-64.
115. See id. at 651.
116. See id. at 663.
117. Id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 663-64.
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individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately, there comes a point at which
the individual's rights overcome the State interest. " '20
Since the decision in Quinlan, the majority of courts in the United
States that have considered this issue have relied on this constitutional
right to privacy to decide cases involving either the refusal of treatment
or the termination of life-sustaining treatment."' This right, however,
is not absolute; it must be balanced against the States' interests in the
individual." The interests most consistently relied on by the States are:
(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent
third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession." z Although these interests
have sometimes outweighed the individual's rights,"M in the majority of
the cases, the patient's right to privacy was greater than the State's interest
in the individual. 12
Euthanasia advocates have relied on this right to privacy in their
crusade."a They believe that since the right to privacy includes the right
120. Id. at 664.
121. See, e.g., cases cited supranote 102.
122. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-05 (Ct. App.
1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224-26 (Ct. App. 1984), aff'd sub
noin. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1986); Severns
v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., 421 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter,
362 So. 2d 160, 162-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980);
State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1989); Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564
N.E.2d 1017, 1022-25 (Mass. 1991); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-27 (Mass. 1977); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410-13
(N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-26 (N.J. 1985); State ex rel. White v.
Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 56-57 (Va. 1982); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743-44 (Wash.

1983).
123. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425.

124. See Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 54 (finding that the State's interest outweighs
prisoner's right to refuse force-feeding).
125. See, e.g., Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (finding that the State's interest in
preserving life is not greater than patient's right to refuse treatment); Satz, 362 So. 2d
at 163 (finding that the patient's rights override State's interests); McAfee, 385 S.E.2d
at 652 (explaining that the State conceded that its interest does not outweigh the patient's
rights); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 435 (finding that the State's interests do not outweigh
patient's rights); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d at 412-13 (finding that the patient's rights
outweigh the State's interest); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d at 744 (finding that the State's
interests do not outweigh patient's rights).
126. See, e.g., Gilbreath, supra note 78, at 422-23.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 37

to refuse medical treatment, it should be extended to include the right to
die. 17

2. Impact of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

The constitutional basis for refusing treatment has recently undergone
a major change." In 1990, the Supreme Court addressed the.
termination of treatment for the first time in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health."2 In this decision, the Court did not rely on the
right to privacy."3 Instead, from its prior decisions and the Fourteenth
Amendment,"' the Court inferred that "a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical

treatment."132 Expressly disapproving of the reliance of many state
courts on the right to privacy, 33 the Court determined that the liberty
interest was more appropriate."' Although the Court did not rely on the
state courts' analyses regarding the right to privacy, the Court used the
same state interests to balance the liberty interest. The Court held that
13 6

to protect its interests,
even though the State may adopt restrictions
13 7
the individual's liberty interest still exists.

Although the Court relied on the liberty interest in deciding

Cruzan,3 8 neither Cruzan nor any other case relying on the liberty
interest'3 9 clarified the distinction between the scope of a liberty interest
127. See id.
128. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 277-78.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing that "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law").
132. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added).
133. See id. at 279 n.7 ("Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse
treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never
so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest.").
134. See id.
135. See id. at 280-82.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (explaining the scope of the liberty interest in the context of an individual
abused by a parent); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to extend the
constitutional right to privacy to homosexuals in light of a liberty interest challenge to
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and the scope of a constitutional right. The Court, however, in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,1" did explain the
conditions under which a liberty interest and its protection are applicable.
In DeShaney, the Court found that
[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's
affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on
his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or
other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the
"deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of the Due
Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests
against harms inflicted by other means.14 1
In the case of euthanasia, the "deprivation of liberty" occurs when the
State restrains a person from acting on his or her own decision regarding
his or her life and death. The liberty interest expressed by the Court in
Cruzan should allow a person the freedom to choose a peaceful death as
long as the individual's interest outweighs the State's interests.
IV. ASSISTED

SUICIDE

A. Application of the Common Law
Although it has not been relied on, a basis for assisted suicide can be
found in the common law.142 In Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford, 43 the United States Supreme Court held that a person has a
right to the control and possession of their person: a right to selfdetermination. 1" Every individual has this control over their own
body.14 A person who commits suicide is simply exercising this right.
Because no mechanism exists by which suicide can be controlled, the State
cannot regulate suicide. 1 6 Moreover, because receiving assistance in a
Georgia's sodomy statute); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that the
liberty interest of natural parents in care, custody, and management of their natural child
prevents the State from severing the rights of parents absent clear and convincing
evidence of neglect).
140. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189.
141. Id. at 200.
142. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
143. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
144. See id.
145. See id. at 250.
146. See Shaffer, supranote 67, at 350.
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suicide is only strengthening the person's control over their own body, the
State should not be able to prohibit such assistance.

B. Application of the Constitutionally ProtectedLiberty Interest
The liberty interest articulated in Cruzan provides a strong basis for
the right to assisted suicide.147 The Cruzan Court held that a competent
individual has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment.'" The refusal of medical treatment will in many
cases result in death. 49 In McKay v. Bergstedt,'11 the Nevada Supreme
Court relied on the Cruzan liberty interest to affirm the lower court's
decision to allow the removal of a respirator from a quadriplegic
dependent on artificial respiration."' The court balanced the State's
interests against the interests of Kenneth Bergstedt and determined that
they did not outweigh Mr. Bergstedt's liberty interest. 52 By permitting
removal of the respirator, the court allowed Mr. Bergstedt to choose his
death.

Thus, the liberty interest has been used to allow a person to choose
death. This interest should be broadened because the term liberty should
be broadly construed.' 53 This freedom to choose death should be
extended to extremely ill people with incurable diseases. It should not rest

on the arbitrary factors of a respirator or a feeding tube.
147. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
149. For example, a Georgia court, relying on the right of privacy, gave Larry
McAfee permission to turn off his ventilator. Because the court knew this would result
in his death, the court was allowing Mr. McAfee to choose death. See State v. McAfee,
385 S.E.2d 651, 651 (Ga. 1989); Charles Edward-Anderson, The Right to Choose Death,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 18. Similarly, a California court gave a patient the freedom to
have her feeding tube removed. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct.
App. 1986). Although as of 1992 she had not yet exercised this right, if she does, she
will starve to death-in effect committing suicide. See id.; Elizabeth Bouvia, The
Reluctant Survivor, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1992, at El; Alan A. Stone, The Right to Die:
New Problemsfor Law and Medicine and Psychiatry, 37 EMoRY L.J. 627, 641 (1988).
150. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
151. See id. at 622.
152. See id. at 622-28.
153. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("'there
can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broadly construed indeed.'")
(quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)); Id. at 169 ("In the words
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 'Great concepts like. . . "liberty" . . . were purposely left
to gather meaning from experience.'") (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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Some commentators argue that because a person on a respirator or
feeding tube will be dying as the result of an underlying illness, the right
to choose death is acceptable. 1" The case of Elizabeth Bouvia, 155
however, seriously undermines this argument. Ms. Bouvia wanted to
escape her physical handicaps (quadriplegia and severe cerebral palsy) but
had no underlying illness to which she might succumb if all life support
equipment were removed. 1" To liberate herself, Ms. Bouvia chose to
starve herself by refusing the assistance she required to eat.1 57 Because
Ms. Bouvia's feeding tube had been inserted against her will, the
158
California Court of Appeals ordered the removal159of the feeding tube.
This is equivalent to the right to commit suicide.
Others argue that this distinction between passive euthanasia, which
allows a person to die a sometimes slow and painful death, and active
euthanasia, which assists the person to a more peaceful death, is
hypocritical."W In McKay v. Bergstedt,6 1 the Court -found that the
Constitution gives a person on a respirator the right to choose death. 62
This right to choose should also be extended to those who are not on a
respirator.
C. Analysis of States' Interest in Assisted Suicide
In cases involving the right to refuse treatment, or the termination of
life-sustaining treatment, the courts have identified four primary state
interests that must be balanced against the individual's rights.1" Assisted
suicide would also have to be evaluated against these interests because
rights and liberty interests are not absolute." Courts will ensure that
any state interests are accounted for before an individual can exercise a
154. See, e.g., Gilbreath, supra note 78, at 421-22; Steven J. Wolhandler, Note,

Voluntary Active Euthanasiafor the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 363, 368-69 (1984).
155. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Ct. App. 1986).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 299.
158. See id.
159. See Stone, supra note 149, at 630.
160. See, e.g., Wolhandler, supra note 154, at 369. The result is the same
regardless of whether it involves an act of omission or an act of commission. Either act

will result in the person's death. Id.
161. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).

162. See id. at 632.
163. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
164. See McKay, 801 P.2d at 626.
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right or liberty interest. 16 Usually, however, to outweigh
individual's rights, the State's interests must be compelling. 1

the

1. Preservation of Life
The States' main interest is in the preservation of life.167 This
interest is greatest when the individual's affliction is curable. In
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 68 the court
noted that the State's interest in individuals with a curable affliction can
be distinguished from cases in which "the issue is not whether but when,
for how long, and at what cost to the individual, that life may be briefly
extended."" In Bouvia v. Superior Court,"7° the individual's quality
of life in the time she had remaining was also an issue.171 In its
decision, the court noted:
Does it matter if it be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months, or 15 to
20 days, if such life has been physically destroyed and its quality,
dignity and purpose gone? As in all matters lines must be drawn
at some point, somewhere, but that decision must ultimately
belong to the one whose life is in issue."
Cases involving people such as Janet Adldns,"
Virginia
Harper, 174 Diane (surname not revealed by physician)," Marjorie
Wantz, 176 and Sherry Miller"7 should be viewed in terms of whether
165. Id. at 621; See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (Ct. App.
1986).
166. See, e.g., Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
167. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425-26 (Mass. 1977) (finding that the State's interests did not outweigh the individual's
rights and approving the application for guardianship that would enable the guardian to
refuse medical treatment for the patient).
168. Id. at 417.
169. Id. at 426.
170. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
171. See id. at 304.
172. Id. at 305.
173. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
175. See Quill, supra note 87.
176. See Colen, supra note 93, at 5; Doctor Assists, supra note 92, at Al;
Wilkerson, supra note 63, at A10.
177. See Colen, supra note 93, at 5; Doctor Assists, supra note 92, at Al;
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the afflictions are curable and in terms of the effects on the quality of the
individuals' lives. Although some of these individuals did not have
terminal diseases,'
when applying this interest to their cases, the

inquiry should focus on what the cost will be to the individual in terms of
their quality of life, if their life were extended.

In In re Quinlan,179 the court found that "the State's interest . . .

weakens... as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis
dims."' In many of these cases, there was not always a bodily invasion
in the Quinlan sense, but the individuals' bodies or minds were being

invaded by disease, and their prognosis for a normal life was dim."'
For example, in Diane's bout with leukemia, "[b]one pain, weakness,

fatigue, and fevers began to dominate [her] life" at the end." For Janet
Adkins, it was her mind that was being invaded by Alzheimer's

n She no longer knew things that she had known her whole
disease."
4

life. '
In McKay v. Bergstedt,'8 which dealt with termination of treatment,
the court found that "as the quality of life diminishes because of physical
deterioration, the State's interest in preserving life may correspondingly
decrease."" 6 These women had either been subjected tw physical
deterioration in the past or would be subject to severe deterioration in the
future." 8 For Sherry Miller, living with multiple sclerosis meant not
Wilkerson, supra note 63, at A10.
178. See Belkin, supra note 80, at Al (54-year-old Janet Adkins suffered from
Alzheimer's disease); Man Cleared, supra note 70, at Bll (Virginia Harper had a
"terminal illness"); Quill, supra note 87, at 692 (Diane had a "terminal illness");
Wilkerson, supra note 63, at A10 (the remaining women had physically or mentally
debilitating incurable diseases).
179. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
180. Id. at 664.
181. See Doctor Assists, supra note 92, at Al, B9; Karen Freifeld, Chronic Pelvic
PainRobbed Her of Hope, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 1991, at 5; Melinda Henneberger,
Useless Limbs Led To Pleafor Death, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 1991, at 5; Quill, supra
note 87, at 692; Wilkerson, supra note 63, at A10.
182. Quill, supra note 87, at 693.
183. See Belkin, supranote 80, at Al.
184. See id. at B6.
185. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
186. id. at 622.
187. See Colen, supra note 93, at 5; Freifeld, supra note 181 at 5; Henneberger,
supra note 181, at 5; Wilkerson, supra note 63, at A10.
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being able to walk or write."' 8 She could barely talk and could not
"function as a human being."' 89
In light of the courts' analyses of the States' preservation-of-life
interest and the foregoing application to cases of assisted suicides, the
State's interest in these cases should be outweighed by the individual's

rights.
2. Protection of Innocent Third Parties
The State's interest in protecting innocent third parties usually applies
in cases in which there are children who will suffer emotional and
financial damage as a result of a parent's or guardian's death. " In cases
that do not affect dependent children, this interest is usually not
analyzed. 9 In assisted suicides, when there are no young children and
all adult family members are in agreement with the individual's choice,
there are no third-party interests to be protected."9 If there are children,
but the death of the individual would not result in their abandonment, the
State's interest would not outweigh the individual's rights.'"
Assisted suicides should be subject to the same guidelines because the
nature of this state interest does not change when it is applied to assisted
188. Henneberger, supranote 181. Sherry Miller testified at a hearing regarding the
legality of a machine constructed to help the terminally ill kill themselves. Explaining her
wish to die, Ms. Miller stated, "I can't walk, I can't write. It's hard for me to talk. I
can't function as a human being." Id.
189. Id.; see also Colen, supra note 93, at 5 (Sherry Miller and Majorie Wantz
"called upon Kevorkian to provide them with aid in dying in order to escape what they
said were unbearable medical problems"); Doctor Assists, supra note 92, at Al (Sherry
Miller, 43, suffered for 12 years from multiple sclerosis and was confined to a
wheelchair; Marjorie Wantz, 58, suffered from pelvic disease).
190. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425 (Mass. 1977).
191. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984), aff'd sub
nom. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1986); Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 985 (1964). Although no "dependent" children were involved, this interest was
analyzed because the patient was 32 weeks pregnant. The third party the State sought to
protect was the fetus. See id. at 538.
192. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359,360 (Fla. 1980), aff'g 362 So. 2d 160,
162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983).
193. See Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (Mass. 1991) (finding
that the State does not have an interest in maintaining a two-parent household in the
absence of compelling evidence that the child will be abandoned if left under the care of
one parent).
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suicide. In the case of Janet Adkins, " the State's interests may have
outweighed Janet's rights because not all of her adult children agreed with
her choice.195 In the other cases, the individuals had the approval of
their families.19'
The regulation of assisted suicide would ensure that the State's interest
in protecting innocent third parties is preserved because the third parties'
interests could be reviewed before assistance is allowed. Because state
legislatures are declining to regulate assisted suicide, however, the rights
of third parties may not be protected, as in the case of Janet Adkins.
3. Prevention of Suicide
States have traditionally claimed a strong interest in the prevention of
suicide." 9 Refusal-of-treatment cases usually did not implicate this
interest, however, because the -individual was dying from an underlying
affliction.198 In one right-to-refuse-treatment case, the court found that
even if the patient had the intent to die, he would not be causing his own
death-the disease would be. " In another case, a Colorado court in
effect gave Hector Rodas permission to starve himself by allowing him to
refuse treatment.' Thus, an individual refusing treatment can have the
intent to die while an individual with a debilitating disease cannot."
The suicide that States are interested in preventing is an irrational selfdestruction,'
and the States' interest is directed at preventing
194. See Belkin, supra note 80, at Al.
195. See id.
196. See Colen, supra note 93, at 28; Doctor Assists, supra note 92, at Al, B9;
Wilkerson, supra note 63, at A10.
197. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425 (Mass. 1977).
198. See id. at 425-26; Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980), aff g
362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220,225 (Ct. App. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical
Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1986).
199. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11.
200. See G. Andrew Kirkpatrick, Rodas v. ErkenBrack, 2 Issuas L. & MED. 481
(1987).
201. See id. at 482.
202. See Gilbreath, supra note 78, at 421-22.
The patient that requests the withdrawal of life support systems, the cases say,
is not seeking self-destruction ....
Conversely, the terminally ill patient who has no life support systems to
disconnect, but wants to die, is said to have a specific intent to die. Therefore,
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Although

voluntary euthanasia is a type of suicide, it is not the type that States are
interested in preventing.' The choices made by Janet Adldns, Virginia
Harper, Marjorie Wantz, and Sherry Miller were rational well-thought-out
choices.' 5 They were not irrational split-second decisions.'
Janet
Adidns made her decision a year earlier when she was first diagnosed with

Alzheimer's disease.'

Virginia Harper also began planning her suicide

when she was diagnosed." Both Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller
discussed suicide with their families and Dr. Kevorkian long before their
suicides.'
Traditional suicide is related to spiritual or mental distress. 1 0
Euthanasia, however, by its very nature, releases the individual from the

grips of a terminal or debilitating disease.2 1 These women were not
21 2
choosing euthanasia because they were in spiritual or mental distress;
they chose euthanasia to achieve inner peace. 213 For example, Diane
(assisted by Dr. Quill) was examined by a psychologist. 2 14 The

psychologist found no evidence of depression." 5 According to Dr. Quill,
his death is classified as self-destruction, suicide ....
mhis terminally ill
person, instead of desiring the removal of intrusive medical procedures, desires
the cessation of pain and agony ....
Id.

203. Id. at 418.
204. H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., Death By Free Choice, in SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA 272-73 (Baruch A. Brody ed., 1989).
205. See Belkin, supra note 80, at Al; Freifeld, supranote 181, at 5; Henneberger,
supra note 181, at 5; Man Cleared, supra note 70, at Bll.
206. See Belkin, supranote 80, at Al; Freifeld, supranote 181, at 5; Henneberger,
supra note 181, at 5; Man Cleared, supra note 70, at Bl.
207. Belkin, supra note 80, at Al.
208. Man Cleared, supra note 70, at BI 1.
209. See Doctor Assists, supra note 92, at Al, B9.
210. Shigeru Kato, JapanesePerspectiveson Euthanasia,in TO DIe OR NOT TO Dif!
69 (Arthur S. Berger & Joyce Berger eds., 1990).
211. See id.
212. See Belkin, supranote 80, at Al; Freifeld, supranote 181, at 5; Henneberger,
supra note 181, at 5; Man Cleared, supra note 70, at Bll.
213. See Belkin, supra note 80, at Al; DoctorAssists, supra note 92, at Al, B9;
Man Cleared, supra note 70, at Bll.
214. Quill, supra note 87, at 692.
215. Id.
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Diane was very peaceful in her last few months because she knew she was
in control of her death.21 6
Because euthanasia is not the type of death that States are trying to
prevent, each case of euthanasia must be analyzed on its facts to ensure

that the decision is a rational one. If it is rational, the individual's rights
should outweigh the State's interests.
4. Maintenance of the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession
The State also has an interest in the maintenance of the ethical

integrity of the medical profession.217 This integrity, for the most part,
relies on the Hippocratic Oath, under which physicians promise to prolong

and protect life.218 But the Oath also appears to be somewhat

contradictory in requiring a promise to alleviate suffering.219 Some

illnesses make it almost impossible for physicians to fulfill both
promises.Y

Recent cases show that doctors often choose to alleviate

suffering when faced with this paradox." Patients should be empowered
to make this choice when these two goals of the Oath are in conflict.

'

216. See id.
217. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
(Mass. 1977).
218. See 10 AMERICANA, supranote 23, at 711 ("[Mlost Western physicians adhere
[to the Hippocratic Oath] as their standard of professional ethics."). One translation of
the Oath reads (in part):
I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and
judgement, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from
whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to any
one if asked nor suggest any such counsel, and in like manner I will not give
to a woman a pessary to produce abortion. With purity and with holiness I will
pass my life and practice my art. I will not cut persons laboring under the
stone but will leave this to be done by men who are practitioners of this work.
Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the sick and
will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption, and further,
from the seduction of females or males, of freemen and slaves.
14 id. at 218.
219. See 10 id. at 711 ("When a patient is in the last and most painful stages of a
fatal disease, to prolong life violates the promise to relieve pain, but to relieve pain by
killing violates the promise to prolong and protect life.").
220. 10 id. ("Euthanasia presents a paradox in the code of medical ethics, for it
involves a contradiction within the Hippocratic Oath, to which most Western physicians
adhere as their standard of professional ethics.").
221. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 2, at C3; Colen, supra note 93, at 28; Quill,
supra note 87, at 692.
222. See Fredrick R. Abrams, Letters to the Editor, 263 JAMA 1197 (1990).
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Although many courts have mentioned this interest in their analyses, it has
never completely outweighed the individual's rights.?
The Oath should not be heavily relied on when this interest is weighed

in relation to euthanasia. Even in the ancient Greek times, doctors did not
always adhere to the Oath.' For example, although some versions of
,the Oath proscribe abortion, surgical remedies, and euthanasia,' these
procedures were fairly common in ancient Greece.'

The Supreme Court and modern medicine do not always comply with
the requirements of the Oath. For example, even though the Oath forbids

abortion,'

the Supreme Court held that a woman has the right to

terminate her pregnancy.'

on that issue.'

The Court did not find the Oath controlling

The medical profession also does not always rely on the

Oath and thus deviates from it daily.'

Some translations of the Oath

proscribe surgery,232 yet some modern doctors perform surgery many
times a day. 22'
Medical ethics are not uniformly applied by doctors. 3 For
example, some doctors will perform abortions'" while others refuse to
perform this procedure? 5 From an ethical standpoint, euthanasia should
be treated the same way. Doctors should be allowed to choose whether to
223. See In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
224. See Curley Bonds, The Hippocratic Oath: A Basis for Modern Ethical
Standards, 264 JAMA 2311 (1990).
225. See ALASTAIR V. CAMPBELL, MORAL DILEMMAS IN MEDICINE 167 (1987).
226. See Bonds, supra note 224.
227. See CAMPBELL, supra note 225, at 167.
228. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
229. See id. at 131-32. The Court examined the history of the Hippocratic Oath and
concluded that it was not accepted by all ancient physicians. See id. This is the only
discussion of the Oath in the Court's analysis. See id.
230. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
231. See CAMPBELL, supra note 225, at 167; 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 218
(16th ed. 1988).
232. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1992, at 949 (Mark S.
Hoffman et al. eds., 1991) (stating that in-patient surgery was performed more than 40
million times in 1989) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC].
233. See supra notes 217-32 and accompanying text.
234. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 232, at 947. In 1988, for every 1000 live
births, there were 325.4 abortions. Id.
235. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 143 (1973) (discussing resolutions adopted
by the AMA House of Delegates which read: "[n]either physician, hospital, nor hospital
personnel shall be required to perform [an abortion which is] violative of personally held
moral principles").
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assist in a suicide. Some doctors, such as Drs. Quill and Kevorkian,
believe that this is part of their duty. 6
The medical profession would greatly benefit from the regulation of
euthanasia. Doctors who want to assist in suicides would then know how
to proceed so that their actions are legal. Although he has already
participated in suicides, Dr. Kevorkian has called for a committee to
establish guidelines for euthanasia.'
V. PHYSICIANS' ASSISTANCE IN SUICIDE

Individuals who have a liberty interest entitling them to euthanasia
should be able to have the assistance of a physician if they desire. 8
Furthermore, the physician should be protected from prosecution by the
liberty interest of the patient. 9
An individual who is exercising his or her own constitutional right is
not subject to criminal prosecution.' In addition, a party, such as the
physician, whose assistance is necessary to assert that constituional right
traditionally is not subject to prosecution either." For example, in
Barrows v. Jackson,' 2 a land seller's defense against a suit for the
breach of a racially restrictive covenant was that the covenant was a
violation of the equal protection rights of the prospective buyers. Because
the seller's actions were necessary for the prospective buyers to assert
their constitutional right, the seller was allowed to use the buyer's
constitutional right as a defense.u 3 Similarly, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, an
236. See Colen, supra note 93, at 28; Doctor Assists, supra note 92, at Al, B9;
Quill, supra note 87, at 694; Ubell, supra note 64, at 28.
237. See NBC Nightly News, supra note 64.
238. Howard Brody, Assisted Death - A CompassionateResponse to a Medical
Failure, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1384 (1992) (proposing that assisted death should be
allowed to let the patient die in a setting of his or her choosing, as free from pain as
possible).
239. See, e.g., Wolhandler, supra note 154, at 376 (proposing that doctors who
assist patients "should be able to defend against prosecution by asserting the patient's
constitutional right to self-determination.").
240. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (holding that private
possession of obscene material is an expression of free speech protected by the First
Amendment and is therefore protected from prosecution.). See also Gilbreath, supranote
78, at 423 (discussing that a terminally ill person has a fundamental right to-die and is
therefore not subject to criminal prosecution).
241. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
242. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
243. See id. at 254-57.
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advocate of the rights of individuals to obtain contraceptives defended
against criminal prosecution by asserting the constitutional right to privacy
of the other individuals. 2"
Physicians also should be able to assert the rights of the patients who
desire euthanasia because the physicians are advocating their patients'
rights and are assisting the patients in asserting those rights. 5 Indeed,
statutes, such as Michigan's new statute,' which make the assister's
actions a crime may not be constitutionally valid in light of the
constitutional liberty interest of the patient. 4 7
For many patients, exercise of their liberty interest would be
impossible without the assistance of a physician.'
To facilitate the
patient's access to their liberty interest, statutes should be revised to allow
physicians to assist their patients in the exercise of their rights. u 9
VI. VOLUNTARY ACTIVE EUTHANASIA: THE SOLUTION

To resolve the euthanasia debate, States should establish guidelines to
protect their interests. Although a 1991 initiative to revise the Washington
State Natural Death Act? for "aid in dying" failed in Washington,"1
this was probably the result of a backlash from Dr. Kevorkian's assistance
in two suicides two weeks earlier.' 2 Dr. Timothy Quill stated that Dr.
Kevorkian's actions are "'going to take the focus away from the really
244. 405 U.S. at 446.
245. See Wolhandler, supra note 154, at 376, Gilbreath, supranote 78, at 423-24.
246. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.547(127) (Callaghan 1990, Supp. 1993).
247. See Sharp & Crofts, supra note 8, at 96.
248. See Wolhandler, supra note 154, at 376.
249. See Morgan & Harty-Golder, supra note 72, at 762; H. Tristram Engelhardt,
Jr. & Michele Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal Sanctions, 36
Sw. L.J. 1003, 1030 (1982); Geltzer et al., supra note 2, at 432.
250. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122 (West 1992, Supp. 1993). The initiative
provides solutions for the following two problems: "1) [a]dult patients in an irreversible
coma or a persistent vegetative state[; and] 2) [a]dult patients who are terminally ill and
who are conscious and mentally competent." WASHINGTON CITIZENS FOR DEATH WITH
DIGNITY, ABOUT INITIATIVE 119 (1991).
251. NBC Nightly News, supra note 64.
252. See Derek Humphry, Tactical ErrorsDefeated ProposedSuicide Law, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Nov. 13, 1991, at 99 ("[M]any people blame the defeat [of Initiative 119] on
the furor over Dr. Jack Kevorkian's helping to end the lives of two women in Michigan
two weeks earlier.").
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meaningful progress we've

made.'"

3

A psychiatrist

who has

interviewed a number of physicians who have assisted in suicides referred
to Dr. Kevorkian as an "'irresponsible, unprofessional madman.'" ' To
ensure that both individual and state interests in euthanasia are protected,
the legislatures should regulate this ongoing practice.
In drafting such legislation, the States must seek to balance their

interests against the interests of the individual.'

To protect their

interest in the preservation of life, the States should enact guidelines

limiting euthanasia to terminally ill and incurably ill patients who have
freely chosen this course.'

The individual's diagnosis should also be

confirmed by at least two physicians to ensure that it is correct.2 "7

The protection of innocent third parties should also be safeguarded by

legislation.
required.'

5

Agreement among all adult family members should be

In addition, the States should ensure that the death will not

result in the abandonment of young children.'

°

The States' interest in preventing suicide is substantially weakened
here."5 These individuals are making a rational choice when faced with

incurable afflictions.'

States, however, should ensure that the

individual's decision was rational and freely chosen by requiring a

psychologist's opinion concerning the patient's mental health.'

The interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical

profession would be better protected by direct legislation than it is at the
253. Colen, supranote 93, at 28 (quoting Timothy Quill, a Rochester internist who
prescribed barbiturates for a terminally ill patient knowing that she would use them to
kill herself).
254. Id. (quoting Harvard psychiatrist, Dr. Susan Block).
255. See discussion suprapart IV.C.
256. See discussion suprapart IV.C.1.
257. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 143 (1973) (discussing the AMA House of
Delegates resolution that asserts that a physician should consult with other physicians
before performing an abortion); Edward R. Grant & Cathleen A. Cleaver, A Line Less
Reasonable: Cruzan and the Looming Debate Over Active Euthanasia, 2 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 99, 240 (1991) (explaining Initiative 119 and its requirement
that the diagnosis be confirmed by two physicians); Wainey, supra note 41, at 663
(discussing a Netherlands' Council that suggests that a doctor must consult with a
colleague before practicing euthanasia).
258. See supra part IV.C.2.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See suprapart IV.C.3.
262. See supra notes 202-16 and accompanying text.
263. See Quill, supra note 87, at 692. Dr. Quill assured himself of Diane's state of
mind after she saw a psychologist and after Dr. Quill discussed the matter further with
her. See id.
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moment.2" Presently, doctors do not know how to proceed when a
patient requests assistance.? Regulation would help to bolster the
integrity of the medical profession while giving doctors the freedom to
choose whether to participate in the practice of euthanasia.
VII. CONCLUSION

Due to advances in medicine, people today live much longer than they
did in the past.' These advances in medicine, however, are a mixed
blessing.'6 Life-prolonging treatment has brought great suffering to
many people.' Individuals should have the right to alleviate their pain
and suffering and choose "death with dignity" under the liberty interest
identified in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.' As
long as the States' four interests are protected, there is no reason to
unreasonably burden this constitutionally protected liberty interest. This
very personal decision should be the patients' alone to make. After all, it
is their life, and their death, that hangs in the balance. 2'
PatriciaA. Unz

264. See supra part IV.C.4.
265. JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD CHOOSE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE

177 (1982).
266. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
267. See supra part IV.C.1.
268. Ubell, supra note 64, at 24-25.
269. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
270. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986).

